Refutability and elementary number theory  by López-Escobar, E.G.K
MATHEMATICS 
REFUTABILITY AND ELEMENTARY NUMBER THEORY 
BY 
E. G. K. LOPEZ-ESCOBAR 
(Communicated by Prof. A. HEYTING at the meeting of March 25, 1972) 
SUMMARP 
It would thus appear that there is not much difference in the case of elementary 
number theory whether one uses for the underlying logic intuition&m, constructible 
falsity or refutability. When the domain of discourse is the species of natural 
numbers, mathematical induction is a very powerful principle which overcomes any 
deficencies which may be present. Thus if one wishes to obtain a separation of 
the concepts of intuitionism, constructible falsity and refutability then either one 
has to give up mathematical induction or else consider some species other than the 
natural numbers. The latter would probably be more interesting. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
If one has been brought up using truth tables, then a statement of 
the form “not-A” causes no problem ; that is “not-A” is true iff A is false. 
But if one wants to go beyond truth tables and yearns for a constructive 
interpretation then one finds that negative statements can be interpreted 
in more than one way. Since it is generally accepted that in a constructive 
interpretation a mathematical proposition A calls for some kind of con- 
struction and it is customary to say that the construction is a proof of A, 
we may interpret “not-A” in one of the following ways: 
(1) there is no construction as required by A, 
(2) the assumption that there is a construction that proves A leads to 
a contradiction; or more specifically, there is a construction x such 
that if p is a proof of A then n(p) is a proof of an absurdity, 
(3) in addition of having the concept of “a construction c proves a 
formula B” there is at hand the concept of “a construction d refutes 
a formula C” and there is a construction which refutes A. 
The interpretation (l), which is related to Curry’s non-demonstrability 
(see CURRY 1957 page 91) is clearly unsatisfactory from a constructive 
viewpoint because it asserts a lack of constructions. (2) is the familiar 
intuitionistic interpretation for negation and there is no doubt that it 
has been a fruitful interpretation. Nevertheless intuitionistic negation has 
certain unpleasant characteristics. For example, if one accepts that there 
is no construction that proves an absurdity (as do most people) then a 
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salient property of the construction JC that proves “not-A” is that when 
n is applied to a particular non-existent construction (namely a proof of A) 
it yields another non-existent construction! 
The third interpretation does not have that problem. Of course it has 
other problems, probably the most damnable being that the number of 
primitive notions is increased. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the merits (if any) of taking 
refutation as the interpretation for negation. The paper is organized as 
follows: In section 1 we state some of the general properties that should 
be satisfied by the notion “the construction c is a refutation of the 
formula A”. Based on the observations in section 1 we then set up a 
Gentzen style formalism in section 2. In Q 3 we present an adaptation 
of Kripke models and the (gist of the) completeness of the interpretation 
via Kripke models is given in $ 4. We end with sections 5, 6 where we 
consider elementary number theory with negation interpreted as refu- 
tation. 
3 1. REFUTATION AS A PRIMITIVE NOTION 
The concept “the wnstruction c proves the formula A” is common to 
most intuitionistic writings. In HEYTINCI 1966 it is considered in informal 
terms; more formal developments can be found in KFLEISEL 1962, TROEL- 
STRA 1968 and in GOODMAN’S thesis 1968. In this section we wish to 
informally discuss the notion “the construction c refutes the formula A”. 
Time will tell whether more formal developments are needed. 
First of all we should observe that how a construction c refutes a 
primitive (atomic) statement depends on the particular discipline that is 
being considered. Thus the ZogicuZZy valid formulae should not be de- 
pendent on how the primitive formulae are refuted; what is important 
is how compound statements are refuted. 
Assuming certain basic operations on constructions, such as forming 
the construction which consists of the ordered pair of two constructions, 
the following conditions on “the construction c refutes the formula A” 
would probably be acceptable to most people: 
i.) the construction c refutes A & B $7 c is of the form (i, d) with i 
either 0 or 1 and if i =0, then d refutes A and if i= 1 then d refutes B, 
ii.) the construction c refutes A v B iff c is of ahe form (d, e> and d 
refutes A and e refutes B, 
iii.) the construction c refutes A 1 B $j c is of the form (d, e) and d 
proves A and e refutes B, 
iv.) the construction c refutes VxA(z) ifl c is of the form (a, d) and d 
refutes A(a), 
vi.) the construction c refutes 3xA(x) i8 c is a general method of wn- 
struction such that given any individual (i.e. construction) from the species 
under consideration, c(a) (i.e. c applied to a) refutes A(a). 
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In order to give the conditions under which a construction c refutes 
7 A we first need the following assumptions about constructions and 
the interpretation of 7 A. 
I. A construction c proves 7 A iff c refutes A. 
II. It is decidable whether or not a given construction proves a 
formula. Similarly it is decidable whether or not a given construction 
refutes a formula. Of course it is possible for a given construction to 
neither prove nor refute a formula. On the other hand we do not think 
that it is reasonable to allow that a given construction c both proves 
and refutes a formula A (although it is possible that a given construction c 
proves a formula A and refutes another formula B, A #B). 
III. Suppose that c is a construction that refutes 7 A. That is c 
refutes that A is refutable. Hence from c we must be able to extract 
the information that no construction will ever refute A. Since we are 
assuming that no construction can both refute and prove the same formula 
and we know from c that no construction will ever refute A, it appears 
reasonable to stipulate that the construction c then proves A. (It could 
also be argued that the only way in which the construction c could encode 
the information that there will never be found a refutation of A is to 
encode a proof of A). 
From the above remarks I, II, and III we then obtain viii. The con- 
struction c refutes 7 A iff c proves A 1). 
0 2. AN AXIOMATIZATION FOR THE CALCULUS 
Gentzen style axiomatizations are the formalizations which are simpler 
to justify on the intended interpretations of the logical operators. For 
the intuitionistic calculus it is possible to restrict oneself to sequents of 
the form r + 0 where r is a finite (possibly empty) sequence of formulae 
and 0 is either empty or consist of exactly one formula. The intended 
meaning of (the provable) A,J, . . . . A&-l + 0 is that there is a construction 
z such that if CO, . . . . ck-1 are constructions that prove Ao, . . ., AK-I then 
n(co, . . . . ct-1) is a construction that proves the formula in 0. Since it is 
rather difficult to visualize how we can have a construction that proves 
the formula occurring in the empty set of formulae we prefer to restrict 
ourselves to sequents of the form: 
Ao, . . . . AH + B. 
By RFC (refutability calculus) we understand the calculus whose 
axioms and rules of inference are the following. 
Axkm schema : 
B+B 
Structural rules of inference. 
l) It also follows that a construction c proves 7 7 A ifT c proves A. 
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Thinning 
Contraction 
Interchange 
cut 
r+B 
A,r+B 
A,A,r+B 
A,r-+B 
A,D,C,r+B 
A,C,D,r-+B 
A+C C,r+B 
A,r+B * 
Logical rules of inference for the quantifiers 
(+ v 
r-+ A(b) 
subject to the usual restriction on the variables. 
v +I 
A(t), r+ B 
BzA(x), r+ B 
(-, 3) 
r + A(t) 
miz(Gj 
(3 -+I 
A(b), r+ B 
3zA(s), r+ B 
subject to the usual restriction on the variables. 
Logical rules of inference for the positive propositional connectives. 
(+ 3 
A,r+B 
r-+Ar>B 
A-PA B,r+C 
AIB,A,r+C 
r+A r-+B 
r+ A&B 
A, C, I’+ B 
A&C,r+B 
24 Indagationes 
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(-* 4 
(v-4 
r+A F+B 
r+AvB F+AvB 
A, F+B C,P+B 
AvC,r+B ’ 
Logical rules of inference for 7 
l-+7 -1 
(7 7 +I 
(-, -7 $) 
(7 &-*I 
(+ 7 4 
(7 v-*1 
(+ -7 3) 
(7 I+) 
(+ -7 v 
(7 V+) 
r+A 
r-*77-A 
A,r+B 
-77A,r+B 
rS7:GtB) r-$EB) 
7A,r+C 7B,r+C 
-7 (A&B),r+C 
r+7A r+7B 
r+ 7 (A vB) 
r-A r-*7B 
r+T(Ar)B) 
r+ 7 A(t) 
r+ --, VxA(x) 
7 A(b), r+ B 
7 VzA(z), r+ B 
subject to the usual restriction on the variables. 
(+ 7 3) 
r-+ 7 A(b) 
rj -, 3ccA(s) 
subject to the usual restriction on the variables. 
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-7 A(t), I’+ B 
--, 3xA(x), I’-+ B’ 
The justification for the axiom schema, structural rules of inference, 
rules of inference for the quantifiers and the positive propositional con- 
nectives can be found in any standard text on intuitionism (for example 
TROELSTRA 1968). The justification of the rules involving 7 is an im- 
mediate consequence of the observations made concerning refutations. 
Por example consider the rule of inference: 
A, Ao, . . . . Ak-l + B 
7 7A, Ao, . . ..Ak-l-+B’ 
It asserts that if we have a construction 7~ such that z(c, CO, . .., ~-1) 
is a construction that proves B whenever c, CO, . . ., ck-1 are proofs of 
A, Ao, . . ., Ak-1 respectively, then there is a construction n* such that 
n*(a, do, . ..) c&-i) proves B whenever d, do, . . . . c&-i proves 7 7 A, Ao, . . . . 
. ..) Ak-1 respectively. But since we have agreed that a construction d 
proves 7 7 A iff d proves A it is clear that for ~3 we may take z itself. 
The remaining rules of inference for 7 can be justified in analogous 
fashion. 
A formula A is provable in RFC (or RFC-provable) iff the sequent 
+ A is provable in RFC. Using some of the results about the intuitionistic 
predicate calculus and straightforward applications of the axioms and 
rules of RFC we obtain: 
THEOREM 1. (1) If a formula A is an instance of one of the axiom 
schema8 for the intuitionistic predicate calculus which do not explicitly 
involve the symbol 7 (i.e. axioms la, lb, 3, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6 of KLEENE 
1952 page 82) then A is RFC-provable. 
(2) If the formula A contains no occurrence of 7 then A is provable 
in RFC ifl A is provable in the intuitionistic predicate calculus. 
(3) The following schema are RFC-provable: 
T(AvB)--A&$7 
-7 (Ar)B)=A& 7 B 
-, VxA(x) EZ 3x 1 A(s) 
7 3xA(x) = Bx 7 A(s). 
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It follows from theorem 1 that if a formula is RFC-provable then it 
is provable in the system for constructible falsity given in NELSON 1949 
(and also in THOMASON 1969). However, the schema 7 A 3 (A 3 B) is 
provable in Nelson’s system but not in RFC. The simplest way to show 
that 7 A 3 (A 3 B) is not RFC-provable is to give a Kripke-style se- 
mantics for RFC. 
5 3. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION FOR RFC 
The interpretation of RFC using constructions is the most natural one 
from a constructive viewpoint. However before one could even attempt 
to prove the completeness of RFC under such interpretation one would 
have to set up a precise calculus for constructions. Since the latter are 
usually rather complicated we prefer to suggest an alternative interpre- 
tation for RFC using a modification of the Kripke models for intuitionism. 
In order to avoid having too many subscripts we shall assume that 
formal language has only one non-logical constant; a binary relation 
symbol P. Then by an RFC-structure we understand a system of the form : 
where 
I is a non empty set, 
K = ({%}ttz, Q > 
< is a reflexive, transitive relation on I, 
‘%I= (AI, R$-, Rr-) where At is a non-empty (inhabited) set and Rt+, Ri- 
are subsets of At x At. 
If i Q j then At C Aj, Re+ C RI+ and Rr- C Rf-. 
If K=({%f)tc~, 9) is an RFC-structure and j E I, then (K, j) (or simply 
KJ) will be called an RFC-realization and Aj the universe of K,. 
The way to interpret an RFC-structure K = ({%~]I~I, 9) is as follows : 
The elements of the index I are viewed as (possible) stages of knowledge 
and the elements of At as the individuals obtained by stage i. Re+ consists 
of those pairs (a, b) of elements of Ai for which there is evidence that 
P(a, b) holds; Rg- consists of those pairs of elements (a, b) for which there 
is evidence that P(a, b) does not hold. Since it is possible that at stage i 
there is neither evidence that P(a, b) holds nor that P(a, b) does not 
hold, it is not natural to require that the union of Rr+ and RI- be Ai x Aa. 
Also since at any given stage i it is possible to have conflicting evidence, 
we must allow the possibility that the intersection of Rr+ and Rt- be 
non-empty. 
The formal definition of satisfaction is as follows: 
DEFINITION 1. If K = ({%~}J~z, <) is an RFC-structure, i E I and s is 
a Ka-assignment (i.e. a function frm the individual variables into the universe 
of Ki) then I=hA[s] and =/QA[s] are defined as follows : (we omit the symbol K) 
A=+, y/) j=iA[d $7 (44, &I)> E Rt+ 
=p [aI iff (44, s(y)) E Rt- 
A=B&C 
A=BvC 
A=BIC 
A = 3xB(x) 
A = VxB(x) 
A=-,B 
I=eA[sl 
=/tA[s] 
I=4 [sl 
=IiA[sl 
l=iA[sl 
=irA[s] 
\=A [sl 
=I& [sl 
l=rA [s] 
=;{A [sl 
l=tA[s] 
=jrA[s] 
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ifi j=iB[s] and /=&‘[s] 
q +B[s] or =p[sl 
$7 I=iB[s] OT I=rC[s] 
i# =/tB[s] and =j&[s] 
ifj I=&T[s] whenever I=jB[s] and i Q j 
ifl I=tB[s] and =l&[s] 
;IJ for some a E Ad, j=tB[s(z/a)] 
ifl for all a E Af and j > i, =jjB[s(s/a)] 
i# for j > i and a E Al, l=jB[s(x/a)] 
ifl for Some a E At, =IiB[s(x/a)] 
ifl =;iB[s] 
i# I=gB[s]. 
DEFINITION 2. A f ormula A is RFC-valid, in symbols: /= A, ifl for all 
RFC-realizations Kt and Kt-assignments s, \=KiA[s]. 
We extend the definition of satisfaction to sequents as follows: 
DEFINITION 3. 
ie \+A,, & . . . 
If S is the sequent Ao, . .., At-1 + B, then I=,$3 [=IKiS] 
& AH 3 B) [=jKi(A,, & . . . & Ah-1 3 B)]. 
The usual proof by induction on the length of the derivation gives that 
THEOREM 2. If the formda A is RFC-provable then it is RFC-valid. 
$ 4. A COMPLETENESS THEOREM FOR RFC 
A reasonable, but not conclusive test whether RFC is a correct formali- 
zation of the intuitive concepts behind the definition of validity using 
the RFC-structures would be a completeness theorem. If one is willing 
to use non-constructive means then the methods used by ACZEL 1968 
to prove the completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus can easily 
be adapted to give 
THEOREM 3. (A completeness theorem for RFC). A formula A is RFC- 
provable i8 it is RFC-valid. 
It would be more interesting to obtain the completeness theorem by 
constructive means, but since RFC includes intuitionism (provided enough 
predicates are used, see next section) it is unlikely that a constructive 
proof could be found. 
On the other hand, even though the proof of the completeness theorem 
may not be philosophically gratifying, at least the semantics introduced 
can be used to obtain simple proofs of the independence of the following 
schemata (and many others): 
7 A 3 (A 3 B), A v 7 A, (A 3 B) 3 ((A 3 -7 B) 3 --, A), 7 (A C% 7 A). 
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$ 5. AN ELEMENTARY NUMBER THEORY BASED ON RFC 
The natural numbers is the obvious place to try out the applicability 
of RFC. One way would be to add to RFC the standard Peano’s axioms. 
However such approach would be arbitrary and would be no more than 
an exercise in axiomatics. A more satisfying method is to go back to the 
intuitive concept of a natural number and then decide which sentences 
(sequenta) should be chosen as axioms. 
We shall assume that a natural number is a construction, in fact we 
shall identify the natural number n with the construction that starts 
by construction 0 and ends with the.construction of n. Furthermore we 
accept Heyting’s observation on page 13 of HEYTINCI 1966 that: 
“The notion of natural number does not wme to us CM a bare notion, 
but frm the beginning it is clothed in properties which I can detect by simple 
observation”. 
To use the natural numbers come clothed with the following concepts : 
& (equality), + (successor), - (predecessor I)), + (addition), . (multipli- 
cation) and 0 (zero). 
The following sequents are to be included in the axioms since they can 
all be positively justified: 
NI a&b+a+tb+ 
N2 a+&b++aeb 
NS +a+Osa 
N4 + a+b+ + (a+b)+ 
N5 -*a-O&O 
N6 +a.b+ta+b+a 
N7 -0-20 
N8 + a+- f a 
Ng atb,a+ccbbc. 
The following schemas, although they may implicitly involve refutation 
must surely be included in any meaningful development of the natural 
numbers : 
NIO A(O), tr,(A(2) 3 A(x+)) -B A(z) 
Nil t e s, A(t) + A(s). 
Of the axioms which explicitly involve 7 the one hardest to justify is 
probably : 
N12 +--71=&o 
1) The use of the predecessor function simpli&s the exposition. 
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where 1 = 0+ (and in general : n = 0+ ... +). Arguments in its favour can be 
found in BROUWER 1954. If one accepts Niz then the following, which 
basically involve changing a refutation having a particular property into 
a refutation with some other property, should cause no problem: 
N13 7 a+b +7bsa 
N14 -, ash -+ 7 b+&a+ 
N15 7 a+&b++ 7 a?b 
Nl6 7 as0 + 7 a+SO. 
And finally the following axioms, although more problematic than Nia-Ni6 
because they involve going from refutations to proofs and conversely, 
are nevertheless no more awkward than Ni2: 
N17 7 asO-+--*-+fa 
Nu a-+sa + 7 a2 0. 
By PN we understand the formal system of elementary number theory 
whose logical basis is RFC and whose number theoretic postulates are 
Ndm 
It is clear that PN is a subtheory of classical number theory, further- 
more it is a proper subtheory of classical number theory because it is 
a subtheory of the system Ni for constructible falsity introduced by 
NELSON 1949 (where it is also shown, by the use of realizability conditions 
that Ni is a proper subtheory of classical number theory). 
The basic difference between PN and Nelson Ni is that in the underlying 
logic for Ni the law of the denial of the antecedent, -, A r> (A 1 B), 
is accepted as an axiom while in RFC it is not. The reason for not including 
it in RFC (or rather its equivalent sequent formulation) is that it is 
difficult to visualize how to obtain, for arbitrary formulae A and B, 
a construction q which proves B from constructions p, T such that p 
proves A and r refutes A ; specially in the case when B has nothing to 
do with A ! Of course if A and B are both number theoretic formulae 
then the rejection of 7 A 3 (A r) B) on the grounds that A and B may 
have nothing to do with each other is questionable. 
It turns out that in the case of PN the question of whether the law 
of the denial of the antecedent should be included or does not come 
up because it is provable in PN. In other words, RFC plus the axioms 
Ni-Nla (which are acceptable on grounds consistent with the principles 
of RFC) allows us to derive the schema 7 A r) (A 3 B) and thus PN is 
(extensionally) equivalent to Nelson’s system Ni. 
The derivation of 7 A r) (A r) B) in PN is best broken down into two 
steps. In the first it is shown that 1 + 0 r) B and in the second that 
A& 7 A31+0. 
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LEMMA 1. The schema 1 G 0 + B is provable in PN. 
PROOF. By repeated application of the axioms (specially the induction 
schema Nro) it can be shown that the following sequents are provable 
in PN 
a+tO+150 
(*I 
(**I 1~00~ a&b 
Then starting with (*) and (**) one can prove, by induction on the 
complexity of the formula B, that 1 f 0 + B is provable in PN. 
LEMMA 2. The schema A, -, A + 1 + 0 is provable in PN. 
Proof is by induction on the complexity of A. 
Basis step. A is an atomic formula. First observe that from Ni7 we 
obtain kpN 7 0 & 0 + 15 0 from which it follows that tPN + 7 0 2 
t 0 3 1 f 0. The latter can then be used as the basis step in the proof 
(via NIO) of kPN + 7 a& a 11 f 0. Then using Nii we obtain 
&a+b, 7 a&6+1&0. 
Induction step. We shall consider one case, namely when A =3xB(x) ; 
the others are similar. From the induction hypothesis we have that 
FEW + B(x) CQ 7 B(z) 3 1 + 0. Using the quantifier rules we can then 
obtain brN + Vx3y(B(z) $ 7 B(y) 1 1 G 0), which in turn leads to 
kPN+3xB(x) & Vy 7 B(y) 1 1~ 0. Then using the equivalences (3) of 
theorem 1 we obtain j-rN + 3xB(x) & 7 3yB(y) 3 1 G 0. The latter is 
then used in order to show that k&7xB(x), 7 3x&x) + 1 s 0. 
Combining the two lemmas we obtain: 
THEOREM 4. The system PN is equivalent to Nelson’s system NL 
It trivially follows that the results obtained by Nelson for Ni can now 
be applied to PN, e.g. translations into intuitionistic systems. An appli- 
cation that can be made of the translations into the intuitionistic system 
is to show that if A, B and 3xC(z) are sentences then 
(a) kPNA v B iff either kPNA or kPNB 
(b) krN3xC(x) iff for some natural number n, k-,gY(n). 
$ 6. INFINITARY EXTENSIONS OF PN (AND Nl) 
Since it can be argued that it is easier to visualize certain infinitudes 
than some negations it may be worthwhile to extend PN (or Ni) by 
allowing infinitary rules of inference; for example Carnap’s rule: 
(w-rule) To conclude I’+ VxA(z) from T-D A(O), . . . . P+ A(n), . . . 
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The first observation that can be made about adding the unrestricted 
w-rule to PN is 
THEOREM 5. If PN, is the system obtained by ao%ing the unrestricted 
w-rule to PN then a sentence A is provable in PN, ifl A is (classically) true. 
PROOF. It can be shown by induction on the complexity of A 1) that: 
If A is true then t-rNo + A and if A is false then j-rNw + 7 A. 
From a constructive viewpoint it is more natural to add a restricted 
w-rule. For example one could require that there be a recursive function 
9 such that for each natural number n, v(n) is a Godel number of a proof 
of r+ A(n) in order to be allowed to derive r+ VxA(x) from 
r+ A(O), . . . . r-+ A(n), . . . . 
Let PN,-, be the system obtained by adding the recursively restricted 
m-rule to PN. 
The notion of P-realizability introduced in NELSON 1949 can be extended 
to sequents and then applying the fixed point theorem for partial recursive 
functions one obtains : 
THEOREM 6. If a sentence A is provable in PN,-, then A is P-realizable. 
From theorem 6 it follows that (a) not all classically true formulae are 
provable in PN,-,, and (b) that some intuitionistic acceptable formulae 
are not provable in PN,-,,. 
On the other hand it can be shown that if A” is the formula obtained 
from A by replacing all parts of the form -7 B by (B 11& 0) then A” 
is provable in PN,-, iff A is provable in HA,-,, intuitionistic arithmetic 
with the recursively restricted o-rule (c.f. with theorem 4 of Nelson 1949). 
Also if A* is the Godel translation of A then it can be shown that A* 
is provable in HA,-, iff A is provable in PA,+.,. 2) But by a result of 
SHOENFIELD 1959, a sentence is provable in PA,-,, iff it is classically 
true. Thus we have 
THEOREM 7. A sentence A of elementary number theory is classically 
true ifl (A*)” is provable in PN,-,. 
College Park, Maryland 
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